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ABBA, FATHER: INCLUSIVE LANGUAGE
AND THEOLOGICAL SALIENCE!
H. E. Baber

Questions about the use of "inclusive language" in Christian discourse are trivial but the discussion which surrounds them raises an exceedingly important
question, namely that of whether gender is theologically salient-whether
Christian doctrine either reveals theologically significant differences between
men and women or prescribes different roles for them. Arguably both conservative support for sex roles and allegedly progressive doctrines about the theological significance of gender, race, ethnicity and sexual orientation are contrary to the radical teaching of the Gospel that in Christ there is no male or
female, Greek or Jew, slave or free man.

The use of "inclusive language" in Christian discourse poses the question of whether gender is theologically salient in the sense of either
revealing theologically significant differences between men and women
or prescribing different roles for them.
Donald Hook and Alvin Kimel claim to "demonstrate that the divine
title '''Father' ... possesses privileged and foundational status within
Christian discourse" and that alternative nomenclature, specifically the
use of "Mother," is illegitimate. They argue that this result follows from
the fact that Jesus authoritatively invoked God as "Abba" or Father
together with a causal account of reference according to which current
attempts to invoke or refer to God do so to the extent that they figure on
a causal chain which originates in Jesus' authoritative act of dubbing.
Their arguments however presuppose an untenable version of the
causal theory of reference as well as questionable assumptions about
Jesus' intention in invoking God as "Abba" which imply that gender is
theologically salient. Arguably both conservative views about the significance of gender and allegedly progressive doctrines about the theological salience of gender, race, ethnicity and sexual orientation are contrary
to the radical, countercultural teaching of the Gospel that in Christ there
is no male or female, Greek or Jew, slave or free man.
I

Hook and Kimel argue that "we name God 'Father' because, and only
because, we are instructed to do by the Second Person of the Holy
Trinity.'" On their account, Jesus decisively fixes the privileged mode of
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nomenclature by invoking God as "Father" and this mode of address
passes down a causal denoting chain maintained by the Church so that
"if we wish to invoke God or refer to him successfully, we rightly return
to the ecclesial d-chain. It is the historical community of the Church that
equips us to name God truly ... for reference to be successful there really
must be a path leading back to the object."3
Hook and Kimel claim that their thesis does not presuppose any additional controversial views about the nature of gender but comes solely
from the authoritative utterance of Jesus as mediated through Scripture
and the Tradition of the Church:
When God is identified as Father, the model of fatherhood is proposed as a paradigm by which deity is to be interpreted. Because
the mode of presentation is metaphoricat such usage commits one
to saying that God both is like and is not like a human father in
specific ways .... By this metaphorical presentation biological sex
and cultural stereotyping may be excluded from our understanding of deity.'
Hook and Kimel suggest that Jesus' invocation of God as "Father" is
revelatory as well as authoritative: "kinship terms of address ... spoken
within the familial relationship" are especially apt in revealing the
nature of our relationship to God in Christ.s "Father," they argue, enjoys
a privileged status that other kinship terms, including "Mother/' do not
in light of the following considerations:
(1) "Abba" was Jesus' mode of address for God and our use of
"Father" to describe and invoke the deity is causally connected
to Jesus' invocation through an "ecclesial d-chain."
(2) "Mother" and "Father" are mutuallv exclusive terms: a correct
ascription of one term to an indiv{dual precludes the correct
ascription of the other so that they cannot be substituted one
for the other. "To do so/' they suggest, " is to disrupt gender
concord and confuse the hearer."
The fact that, applied to the deity, the use of 'Mother' and 'Father' must
be metaphorical. .. does not alter this more basic grammatical point: if
'Father' properly designates the deity, then 'Mother' cannot logically do
so-and vice versa .... Metaphor does not obliterate the conventional
meaning of a word."
Thus, on the account Hook and Kimel suggest, "Abba" names God,
and the privileged and foundational status which Jesus' invocation confers on "Abba" is transmitted down the ecclesial d-chain to "Father."
"Mother" cannot be substituted for "Father" since "Mother" and
"Father" are mutually exclusive.
The suggested account is reminiscent of mathematical induction:
Base Step: Jesus established [or revealed] "Abba" as a foundational name
of God by invoking him as "Abba."
Induction Step: N is a foundational name of x if N is a referential succes-
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sor of a foundational name.
It is the account of referential succession Hook and Kimel assume that
lets "Father" in while excluding "Mother." Their account can be reconstructed as follows:
N is a referential successor of N* iff
(1) the practice of using N to refer to x is causally linked to the use of N*
and
(2) Nand N* are logically compatible with regard to any significant
descriptive content they may possess.
According to Hook and Kimel, "Father" succeeds Jesus' "Abba" on an
ecclesial d-chain insofar as the practice of translating rather than transliterating "Abba" is established within the Church. "'Father'" they note,
"confers descriptive content, which is why the word is always translated
from language to language as the Gospel moves into new cultures.'"
Translators operating from within the Church conventionally translate" Abba" rather than transliterating it and in so doing signal that they
regard the descriptive content of the term as significant. "Father is a referential successor of "Abba" and, therefore, given their account of
"foundational" names is a foundational name of God.
"Mother," Hook and Kimel argue, is not a referential successor of
"Abba" since its descriptive content is logically incompatible with that
of "Abba." Consequently, "Mother" fails (2) . Its use as a foundational
name, Hook and Kimel suggest, would require a "new revelation" -presumably a new act of authoritative tagging comparable to Jesus' invocation of God as "Abba."
1I
It is not clear whether the criterion for referential succession reconstruct-

ed from the account suggested by Hook and Kimel is intended to apply
to all referring expressions that have descriptive content, to those which
they identify as titular names, a class which includes "mother," "father"
and other kinship terms, or only to those uses of titular names that have
foundational status, in particular, to the use of "Father" to invoke and
refer to God. (i) If however the intent of Hook and Kimel is to articulate
an account of reference specific to foundational names then the account
is ad hoc and they have not established the result which it is supposed to
support; (ii) if it is intended to be an account of how titular names or
kinship terms generally function it is plainly false.
(i) It is disputed whether "father" as used to invoke and refer to God
possesses a privileged status which disqualifies all antonymous names
and other expressions from referring to him. If it could be shown that
there were non-contentious cases of referring expressions which were
significantly similar to "father" in possessing a similarly privileged status and which uncontroversially precluded antonymous expressions
from referring, that would lend support to the thesis of Hook and Kimel
that the same was true of the theological use of "father."
Hook and Kimel however make no attempt to show that there are
other referring expressions which playa privileged and foundational
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role within their respective contexts comparable to the role that they
assert "father" plays within Christian discourse. In fact there do not
seem to be any: the foundational status they ascribe to the ecclesial use
of "father" and its cognates appears to be sui generis. Consequently they
cannot point to the behavior of comparable referring expressions in
cases which are not contentious in support of their disputed thesis that
"father," in virtue of its foundational status, behaves as they contend it
does, in particular, that it precludes the use of antonymous expressions
as its referential successors.
Hook and Kimel may indeed stipulate that no referring expression,
N, which is antonymous to a foundational name, N*, of an object can be
a referential successor to N*, build this into the criteria for investing a
name with foundational status and conclude that non-foundational
names for God shall not be used in liturgical or theological contexts
because "foundational name" is a term of art which they themselves
have invented. It has no precedent in Scripture or Tradition so they are
at liberty to define it as they choose.
They have not however provided any reason why Christians ought to
buy into this account other than an interest in supporting the contention
that "Father" should be used within the Church to invoke and refer to
God and that "Mother" should not, which is precisely what is in dispute.
Thus if their proposed conditions for referential succession are meant to
attach only to "foundational" names they have not made their case.
(ii) Taken as an account of reference generally, the conditions which
Hook and Kimel propose for referential succession are implausible.
They yield highly unintuitive results in a variety of ordinary cases
where speakers misdescribe the objects to which they refer. Causal theories of reference attempt to accommodate our intuitions in such cases
and in the absence of special theological concerns, such as Hook and
Kimel suggest arise from the "foundational" status of "Father," they
provide no cause for concern about the possible failure of "Mother" to
refer to the Being Jesus invoked as "Abba" even if "Mother" is, in some
respect, misleading.
A virtue of causal theories of reference vis-a-vis description theories is
their ability to explain how language users may succeed in referring to
objects when they are ignorant or positively mistaken about their character. Thus, in an early article on the causal account of reference, Keith
Donnellan, cites a variety of cases in which definite descriptions that are
descriptively inaccurate succeed in referring. Distinguishing between
the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions, he notes that
a speaker uses an expression referentially in order to enable his audience
to pick out whom or what he is talking about.' As the cases he cites suggest, we may succeed in picking out a person or thing for the purpose of
asking a question or making an assertion about it by means of a description which is inaccurate.
Donnellan and other causal theorists have considered circumstances
in which the descriptive content of referring expressions for language
users and their communities may deflect or defeat reference. Reference
however is robust: generally, contriving convincing cases in which refer-
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ence is deflected or defeated requires the construction of elaborate scenarios or stories in which speakers make gross errors.
Perhaps 1 fail to refer in some extreme circumstances ... suppose that
I think that 1 see at some distance a man walking and ask, 'Is the
man carrying the walking stick the professor of history?' We
should perhaps distinguish four cases .... (a) There is a man carrying a walking stick ... (b) The man over there is not carrying a walking stick but an umbrella .... (c) It is not a man at all but a
rock ... (d) ... there is nothing at all where I thought there was a man
with a walking stick .. perhaps a trick of light made me think there
was a man there. 9
Donnellan suggests that, intuitively, reference succeeds in all but the last
case: "failure of reference ... requires circumstances much more radical
than the mere non-existence of anything fitting the description used. It
requires that there be nothing of which it can be said, 'That is what he
was referring to.IIIID
A causal connection between the use of a name and an act of tagging
does not always suffice to secure reference. Gareth Evans and others
have considel:ed circumstances in which the descriptive content of
names for language users and their linguistic communities may affect or
defeat reference. I I Nevertheless apart from special theological considerations such as Hook and Kimel suggest, the case of antonymy they cite
does not appear to be a defeater.
Mistakes about kinship status and gender are common and do not
appear to defeat reference. We may successfully refer to babies and
young children without knowing their gender and to adolescents who
cultivate a unisex look even when we are mistaken. Under less than
optimal observational conditions we easily make such mistakes. When I
see other parents at a distance in their cars picking up their children or
dropping mine off in the evening I often mistake mothers for fathers and
vice versa. My children set me straight but none of us seriously doubts
that I have succeeded in referring to them.
An advantage of the causal theory of reference over description theories is precisely their success in delivering the intuitively correct results
in clear cases like this. Adopting the kind of descriptive criteria Hook
and Kimel propose, according to which mistakes about parental gender
make reference at best questionable, undermines an important motivation for preferring causal accounts of reference to description theories.
The appeal of Hook and Kimel to the causal theory of reference in
support of their thesis fails. Without special theologically motivated provisos, the causal theory of reference will not generate the results they
seek, and the theological motivation for their account, beyond an ad hoc
interest in blocking the use of "Mother" in theological contexts is, at
best, obscure. The provision of terminology and technical machinery to
articulate a controversial thesis does not contribute to showing that the
thesis is true and Hook and Kimel have provided no compelling reason
to believe that their account has any independent motivation.
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III
Hook and Kimel suggest that there may be independent theological reasons to avoid using "Mother" to invoke and refer to God within the
Church. Their concern appears to be that "mother" and "father" designate roles which may be "theologically incompatible."
Theoretically, the title 'Mother' could be substituted for 'Father,'
either by tying it into the current Father-chain or by instituting a
new referential path. The following questions would still have to
be answered satisfactorily before the Church could authorize either
option. Do we know that God accepts 'Mother' as a vocatival substitute for 'Father.'? If it is advanced that God is now inviting
prayer to him/her as Mother, this claim would appear to require a
new revelation ... .Is such revelation probable in light of the eschatological finality of 'Father'? ... Considerations regarding content also
appear at this point. Are the terms synonymous? If they are not (as
we argue below) then judgment must be made as to their theological compatibility. 12
While they argue at length that "Mother" and "Father" are incompatible in the sense that they cannot accurately describe the same [normal?]
individual in literal discourse, they do not offer any compelling reason
why such incompatibility in literal discourse should render expressions
theologically incompatible when used metaphorically or analogically as
they grant to be the case for talk about God as FatherY Literal theological discourse is indeed constrained by such logical requirements. The
thesis that God is omnipotent, for example, is theologically as well as
logically incompatible with claims to the effect that his power is in some
respects limited.
Religious discourse which is metaphorical or analogical however
does not operate within these constraints. Scripture includes a variety of
metaphorical and analogical expressions which all orthodox Christians
recognize as proper designations of God that are logically incompatible
in the sense that they could not be literally true of the same individual.
In st. John's Gospel, Jesus proclaims himself to be the Good Shepherd,
the Way, the True Vine, and the Bread that comes down from Heaven,
designations which cannot be literally true of the same individual.
Within religious discourse gender also sits lightly. So Thomas Berry
in a popular religious studies text book, apparently oblivious to conceptual difficulties, notes of the transformation of the bodhisattva
Avalokitesvara within the Buddhist Tradition:
"This savior personality, originally a masculine figure, was gradually
changed by the Chinese into a feminine figure ... Eventually
Avalokitesvara, as Kuan-Yin, became the goddess of mercy of the EastAsian world."!4
Both scholars who view the Buddhist Tradition from without and
religious believers within the Tradition identify Avalokitesvara and
Kuan- Yin. Although "god" and "goddess" are antonyms neither
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Buddhists nor scholars of Buddhism seem to have any logical compunctions about describing Kuan-Yin as the Chinese representation of the
bodhisattva called" Avalokitesvara" in Tibet. Their identity of role
together with the causal connection between references to them make
the identification of Avalokitesvara and Kuan-Yin compelling. Similarly,
early within the Church's history, Christ was identified with the divine
wisdom, personified as the female figure Sophia and Christians have
had no logical scruples about invoking him as such: "0 Word of God
incarnate, 0 Wisdom from on high."
Hook and Kimel say nothing about the alleged non-biological difference between fatherhood and motherhood as roles but repeatedly
invoke the grammatical incompatibility of "mother" and "father" in
smpport of the thesis that even in metaphorical discourse where the biological components of gender do not figure they designate distinct properties which may be theologically incompatible. The grammatical
antonymy of "mother" and "father" by itself does not however support
even a prima facie case for the distinctness or incompatibility of the roJes
they designate.
Gender distinctions in the designation of social and professional roles
are dying out in English as a consequence of political correctness and the
natural tendency of English to lose inflections: "Poetess" is now archaic,
"actress" may be on the way out, and "directress" survives only within
altar guild contexts. In these cases however grammatically masculine
and feminine forms do not mark any difference in role but rather track
the gender of the roles' occupants.
By contrast "governor" and "governess" designate entirely different
roles. A woman who occupies the office of chief state executive is never
ca lled a "governess." A sign that the governor / governess distinction is
one of role rather than mere grammatical gender is precisely the willingness of language users who make the distinction to allow that women
may be governors as well as governesses. Language users who make the
actor / actress distinction by contrast will not allow for the characterization of some women as actors and other as actresses precisely because
this distinction merely marks the gender of the occupant and indicates
no difference in role.
Like actor / actress, and unlike governor / governess, "mother" and
"father" appear to designate the same role occupied by a woman and a
man respectively: a mother is a female parent; a father is a male parent."
Once the biological components of parenthood and "cultural stereotyping" are factored out it is hard to see what remains of any difference in
role, and the oddity of suggesting in literal discourse that there could be
female fathers as well as mothers suggests that, like most gendermarked designations of social and professional roles, the mother / father
distinction merely serves to track the gender of the occupant.
Hook and Kimel suggest that kinship terms are significant in
Christian discourse insofar as they evoke a role God plays in relation to
us through Christ. Whether fatherhood and motherhood are different
roles or not, the grammatical considerations they cite do not by themselves make even a prima facie case for holding that motherhood and
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fatherhood are different roles much less theologically incompatible ones,
or any reason to think that "father" and "mother" do not do an equally
good job of designating the parental role which God occupies vis-a-vis
his creatures.
IV

Finally it may be suggested that calling God "Mother" is potentially misleading to the extent that it is a product of linguistic revision in support
of an agenda. "Mother" as currently used to invoke and refer to God, is
often embedded in an ideology which some argue is heterodox.
If the ideological commitments of a linguistic community are too far
out of whack reference may be deflected or fail. Consider the case of
"Santa Claus," a corruption of the Dutch name of St. Nicholas, a fourth
century bishop of Myra. Legends developed about Bishop Nicholas
shortly after his death-people told stories about him and had false
beliefs about him. Some Santa Claus lore can be traced back to these stories and there is a clear causal chain extending from the dubbing of
Bishop Nicholas to the current use of "Santa Claus." However virtually
no one wants to say that contemporary Santa Claus lore is really about
Bishop Nicholas.";
It is not clear when the St. Nicholas myth got out of hand.
Nevertheless, unquestionably, at this point Santa Claus lore about the
elves workshop and the Miracle on 34th Street has so swamped the core
story about a generous bishop who anonymously gave dowries to poor
girls, that Santa Claus talk is not about the historical St. Nicholas at all.
Given the surrounding ideology the causal chain linking "Santa Claus"
to the Bishop of Myra does not suffice to secure reference.
Similarly, even if there is a causal chain linking Jesus' invocation of
God as "Father" to current use of "Mother" to designate the First Person
of the Trinity, it may be argued that reference is defeated if these terms
are embedded in an ideology remote from Jesus' intention, the theology
implicit in Scripture, and the practice of the Church.
One reason for concern is the alleged incompatibility of feminine language and imagery with the traditional understanding of God as "pure
act." Many advocates of calling God "Mother" are motivated by an interest in affirming God's possession of qualities which they and their opponents alike regard as characteristically feminine-his receptivity, nurturance and care. Their opponents worry that this account fails to do justice
to the alleged centrality of his metaphysical characteristics which it is
suggested "fit together so as to designate one simple property of having
necessarily pure, limitless, intentional power." 17 On this account, power,
allegedly a masculine property, is central to our understanding of the
divine nature; God's nurturance and care, shown in his transactions with
us as revealed in Scripture and most particularly through his Incarnation
as Jesus Christ are .secondary to his metaphysically essential core characteristics as God. Thus Hook and Kimel suggest that "we may speak figuratively of God as an eagle nurturing her young or as a mother bear protecting her cubs; but we will name him 'father' and not 'mother."'18
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These considerations are not persuasive. It is a moot point whether
we ought to conceive of God primarily as a being of pure, limitless,
intentional power and only secondarily or figuratively as loving and
nurturing. More importantly for the purpose of this discussion it is also
controversial whether we should identify power as masculine and nurture as feminine for theological purposes. Scripture and Tradition are
replete with masculine nurturant images, most notably that of the Good
Shepherd, and feminine images of power, including the image of the
Woman Clothed in the Sun crushing the Serpent under her heel. Insofar
as we deny the assumption that gender is theologically salient, we shall
reject the identification of power as masculine and nurture as feminine
and regard gendered talk about God as ideologically innocent.
Arguably, while the use of gendered language may be innocuous, the
thesis that gendered nomenclature is theologically significant is not.
Indeed, insofar as it assumes that gender is theologically salient, it is
contrary to Scripture and the Church's Tradition.
The Church is incarnate in a world where distinctions of race, blood
and gender figure and it accommodates itself to its cultural context-like
Paul, all things to all men in order to win all to Christ. Still, speculative
doctrines about the ontological foundations of gender have never been
central to Christian theology. No such doctrines figure in the historic
creeds of the Church and to the extent that Christian bodies have supported sex roles they have done so as part of a more global program of
enjoining Christians to do the duties prescribed for the state of life in
which they were called. This affirmation of the existing order mayor
may not be legitimate. What is significant is that traditionally gender has
not typically been conceived of as deeper, more "ontologically" significant or more theologically loaded than other features of individuals' biological heritage or social location.
The thesis that "Father" as distinct from "Mother" possesses a "foundational, privileged status" appears to presuppose that gender is theologically salient, that there are theologically significant differences between
males and females and, to the extent that this distinction is taken to be
normative as well as descriptive, that men and women ought, in at least
some respects, to play different roles. This is contrary to the radically
countercultural Christian insight that there are no significant differences-between male and female, Greek and Jew, slave or free.
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